State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from March 17, 1981 by New York State Public Employment Relations Board
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Board Decisions - NYS PERB New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
3-17-1981 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions 
from March 17, 1981 
New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Board Decisions - NYS PERB by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from March 17, 
1981 
Keywords 
NY, NYS, New York State, PERB, Public Employment Relations Board, board decisions, labor disputes, 
labor relations 
Comments 
This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, 
Cornell University. The information provided is for noncommercial educational use only. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions/226 
STATE OF MEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondent, 
-and-
DONALD. J. BARNETT, 
Charging Party. 
#2A-3/17/81 
' BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4165 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
HOWARD N. MEYER, ESQ., for Charging 
Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the United 
Federation of Teachers (UFT) to the decision of a hearing officer 
that it violated §209-a.2(a) of the Taylor Law by refusing to 
furnish Donald J. Barnett, a nonmember, with representation at 
a hearing to review an unsatisfactory rating. UFT acknowledged 
that it furnishes representation at such hearings to members, 
whirle refusing to do so for nonmembers. It argued, however, that 
this is permissible conduct because such hearings derive from the 
by-laws of the employer and not from UFT's collective bargaining I 
agreement with the employer. J 
FACTS 
As noted by the attorneys during oral argument, a conse-
quence of an unsatisfactory rating is that the recipient employee 
will not receive the incremental salary increase to which he would 
otherwise be entitled. Appeals from unsatisfactory ratings may 
6770 
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be taken pursuant to §5.3.4 of the by-laws of the employer. The 
appellate hearings are commonly called 105A hearings by reason 
of their former designation in the by-laws of the employer. The 
by-laws of the employer permit a unit employee who has initiated 
a 105A hearing, 
"to be accompanied and advised by an employee of 
the board or a representative of the union recog-
niz:ed_ by_ the. boar d.. as the.i collect ive_.bar gaining. __ 
representative of the employee;:-.... The adviser' 
may not be an attorney." 
UFT trains a cadre of lay personnel to represent fellow members of 
UFT in 105A cases. On occasion it assigns a full-time union rep-
resentative to do so. When Barnett sought UFT representation at 
his 105A hearing, he was informed that, "The policy of the United 
Federation of Teachers is that we do not and we are not required 
to represent non-Union members at the ,:U,: Rating hearings." On 
the date of the 105A hearing, Barnett indicated his wish to be 
represented by the UFT and he requested an adjournment of the 
hearing to secure representation. His request was granted and the 
hearing was adjourned. 
The hearing officer determined that UFT's refusal to fur-
nish Barnett with representation at the 105A hearing violated 
§209-a.2(a) of the Taylor Law for three reasons. First, he 
determined that UFT's duty of fair representation extends to 105A 
hearings because they have a contractual basis. The basis is that 
the contract provides for the continuation of 
"All existing determinations, authorizations, 
by-laws, regulations, rules, rulings, resolutions, 
...affecting salary and working conditions of the 
employees in the bargaining unit shall continue in 
force,..." (emphasis supplied) 
Second, he further found that the duty of fair representation 
! j 
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1 
j 
would apply to benefits that are not based upon a collective j 
bargaining contract so long as the benefits are job-related. j 
Finally, he found that representation in 105A hearings 
is a benefit of sufficient significance so that denial of this 
benefit to nonmembers would have the effect of coercing them to 
join UFT. 
_  . _ ._In_-_suppo-r t._ of . its except ion-.s_j.__ UFT argues, .that... the.. ..charge i 
was premature because no 105A hearing has yet been held. On the 
merits it reasserts the argument that the 105A appeals procedure 
is based upon the by-laws of the employer only; thus, while UFT 
trains lay advocates, it has no legal responsibility for the 
appeals process. In support of this argument, it asserts that UFT 
has no exclusive status regarding representation of employees in 
105A proceedings in that employees may be.represented by other 
employees of the employer. It acknowledges the exclusivity of its 
status, however, to the extent that no representatives of any 
other employee organization may represent emoloyees at a 105A 
1 ' " 
hearing, 
DISCUSSION 
The charge, which alleges that UFT refused to represent 
Barnett because he is not a member, is not premature. UFT's re-
fusal to represent Barnett was unequivocal and final. Whether or 
not-..the 105A':hearing^ .was\held:\w'as.,'';thereforE--, not i.a "prerequisite, 
to .the filing:, of :.the charge...'. 
i 
i 
1 UFT notes that Barnett is an agency shop fee payer. It argues 
that this fact does not of itself impose upon it a duty to 
furnish him with representation at a 105A hearing. We do not 
reach this question. 
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The granting or withholding of representation in 105A 
hearings is not a private natter between UFT and its members. It 
goes to an important aspect of the relationship between unit 
employees and their employer. An unsatisfactory rating of an 
employee will affect that employee's eligibility for an incremen-
tal salary increase and ma]? be considered as the basis for disci-
pline., As such, it affects the employee's compensation and other 
terms- and.._ conditions ofemployment ....— UFT's refusal to represent 
nonmembers in such hearings, while affording representation to 
members, is a violation of its duty to represent nonmembers fairly 
It coerces them in their right to refrain from joining or parti-
cipating in the affairs of UFT. 
NOW, THEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the hearing 
officer, and 
VIE ORDER: 
1. UFT, its officers, agents and affiliates, to 
cease and desist immediately from refusing to repre-
1
 •..••. sent, -nonmembers at .rating^review, proceedings , com-, 
monly known as 105A hearings, pursuant to §5.3.4 of 
the by-laws of the Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York and 
to provide nonmembers with representation in any 
pending and future such proceeding on the same basis 
as it provides representation to its members; and 
2. that UFT shall cease.and desist from interfering with, 
restraining or coercing public employees in the 
exercise of their rights under the Act, and shall 
post a notice in the form attached, at each facility 
at which any unit personnel are employed, on bulletin 
61 
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boards to which it has access by contract, practice 
or otherwise. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
March 17, 1981 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
^^f^t 
David C, Randies, Membe 
Board Member Ida Klaus did not participate in the discussion 
and decision of this case. 
i *4 
APPENDIX 
ill 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate ihe policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLiC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York employed in the following 
categories: teachers in the regular day school instructional -
program; all those employed as per session teachers; all those 
assigned as teachers at WNYE; all primary and non-primary adult 
education employees and teachers assigned to headquarters or 
district offices (except supervisors and occasional per diem 
substitutes) that: 
1) The United Federation of Teachers (UFT), its officers, 
agents and affiliates will represent nonmembers at rating 
review proceedings, commonly known as 105A hearings., 
pursuant to section 5.3.4 of the Bylaws of the Board of 
Education of the pity School District of the City of 
New York and will provide such representation at any 
pending or future such proceeding onrthe same basis as 
representation is provided to members of UFT. 
2) The UFT will not interfere with, restrain or coerce . 
any public employee in the exercise of rights 
under the Act. 
United Federation of Teachers 
Dated. By. 
(Roprosonlalive) (Tl(le) 
This Notica must remain posted lor 30 consecutive dnys trom the data ot posting, and must not br: uitcrec 
defaced, or cavorod by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LEVITTOWN UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
ASSOCIATION OF LEVITTOWN SCHOOL 
ADMINISTRATORS, COUNCIL OF ADMINIS-
TRATORS & SUPERVISORS, LOCAL 12, 
AF.SA, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
COOPER, ENGLANDER & SAPIR (ROBERT E. SAPIR, ESQ. 
and DAVID M. COHEN, ESQ., of Counsel), for 
Respondent 
JOHN T. MURRAY, ESQ., for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Levittown 
Union Free School District (District) to a hearing officer's 
decision that it violated its duty to negotiate in good faith with 
the Association of Levittown School Administrators, Council of 
Administrators & Supervisors, Local 12, AFSA, AFL-CIO (Association). 
The hearing officer determined that the District violated its 
duty to negotiate in good faith by unilateral^ eliminating a pro-
gram which permitted unit employees who retire to be paid for up 
1 
to 180 days of accumulated sick leave. 
The record shows that the District and the Association had 
been parties to a collectively negotiated agreement which expired 
on June 30, 1979. The expired agreement provided, inter alia, for 
the payment of up to 180 days of accumulated sick leave to unit 
employees who retire and who apply for such payment "no later than 
February 1 of the last year of active service". To be eligible 
1_ Other provisions not here applicable apply to those who 
resign or die. 
6HWK-;.0> i it) 
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for this sick leave/termination pay benefit, a unit employee must 
have had at least 20 years of credited service, 15 years of which 
were in the District. The contract set a maximum annual obliga-
tion for the District and provided that if there were too many 
applications, the money would be distributed on the basis of sen-
iority. 
.. ... ... .....In January.19 80, .eight unit .employees ...indicated .their, in- . 
tention to retire during 1980, contingent upon their receiving 
the sick leave/termination pay benefit. On February 27, 1980, 
the District wrote to one of the applicants: "Please be advised 
that these benefits are no longer available and have not been 
available since June 30, 1979." The charge herein was filed on 
March 21, 1980 and, on April 1 and 2, 1980, the District wrote to 
the Association and to the applicants indicating that it had re-
ceived no letters of retirement^ and that it would not consider 
the eligibility of any of the applicants for the sick leave/ 
termination pay benefit until an unqualified retirement applica- >. 
tion was received. 
On these facts, the hearing officer determined that the 
District violated its duty to negotiate in good faith and the 
District has filed exceptions to that determination. It makes 
"2 The Association objects to our consideration of the exceptions 
on the ground that they were not served upon it. Respondent 
served a copy of its exceptions upon J. ¥. Trauernicht, who 
was the original representative of the Association.. The 
Association asserts that the District knew or should have known 
that Trauernicht had been superseded as its representative. 
The record does not support this assertion. Neither does it 
show any prejudice by reason of the service upon Trauernicht. 
Accordingly, we deny the Association's objection to our con-
sideration of the exceptions. 
/ t' ( 
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three arguments in support of its exceptions: 
1. The charge was premature. The District could 
not be held to have repudiated the alleged obliga-
tion because the time for the performance of that 
obligation was not yet ripe, there being no unquali-
fied resignations. 
2. The duty to provide sick leave/termination pay 
did not survive the expiration of the contract. It 
is comparable to salary increments which, according 
to Rockland County BOCES, 41 NY2d 753, 10 PERB 117010 
— -•- (1977) ; need not be -provided after -the- expiraliion- of 
a contract. 
3. If distinguishable from increments, the District's 
conduct was authorized by Wappinger, 5 PER.B 1f3074 
(1972), because there was a compelling reason for the 
District to act unilaterally at the time it did and 
it had negotiated the matter in good faith to impasse 
before making the change. 
These three arguments were all presented to the hearing officer 
and rejected by her. We affirm the decision of the hearing 
officer. 
The charge, was not premature. The District's letter of 
February 27 constituted an unequivocal repudiation of its obli-
gation under the expired contract and a unilateral change in terms 
and conditions of employment. That repudiation is a sufficient 
basis for the charge. The subsequent letters of April 1 and 2, 
1980, which followed the filing of the charge, are self-serving 
statements having no effect on the implication of the earlier 
letter of repudiation. 
The sick leave/termination pay benefit is not comparable 
to increments. The concern of the Court of Appeals in Rockland 
County was that the payment of increments alters rather than main-
tains the status quo. It saw increments as being an increase over 
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the benefits that the prior agreement required to be paid. The 
sick leave/termination pay benefits required by the contract 
clause in question were not increased after the expiration of the 
contract. The identical benefits were payable during the life 
of the expired contract. 
The Wappinger conditions were not satisfied. As its 
letter ~ states, —the employer - made the unilateral - change-on-- June 30 , 
1979, although it did not announce the change until February 27, 
1980. Neither did it, at any time, notify the Association of its 
intention to make the change. The record does not establish a 
compelling need for the change at the time it was made. Certainly 
there is no indication that the parties had exhausted all avail-
able opportunities at that time to resolve the dispute through 
1 
negotiations, and were at a genuine deadlock, or that the 
District was prepared to continue negotiating the matter after 
making the change. Any efforts it may subsequently have made 
4 
to negotiate did not cure the earlier violation. 
3 See Troy City School District, 11 PERB 13056 (1978). 
4 This would be so even if the change were deemed to have been 
'""" made on February 27, 1980, and not on June 30, 1979. As of 
the date of the close of the record herein, no agreement was 
reached to succeed the one that had expired on June 30, 1979, 
and the dispute was before a factfinder. Among the issues 
in dispute was whether the sick leave/termination pay provision 
should be continued. 
Board - U-4616 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the Levittown Union Free School 
District to: 
1. Cease and desist from making unilateral changes 
in terms and conditions of employment of the employees 
in the negotiating unit represented by the Association 
of Levittown School Administrators. 
2. Process the applications for retirement and sick 
leave/termination pay of the eight unit employees sub-
mitted in January 1980 in accordance with the provi-
sions of the contract that expired on June 30, 1979. 
3. Negotiate in good faith with the Association of 
Levittown School Administrators. 
4. Post a notice in the form attached at all loca-
tions ordinarily used for communications directed to 
the administrative staff. 
DATED, Albany, New York 
March 17, 1981 
Jv^t bsths^ASW-*^ 
HAROLD TC NEWMAN, Chairman 
«*&• Ai&4>U^^ 
IDA KLAUS, Member 
lifVID C . RANDLES , 
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TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify our employees that: the Levittown Union Free School District 
1. Will not make unilateral changes in terms and conditions 
of employment of the employees in the negotiating unit 
represented by the Association of Levittown School 
Administrators as embodied in the expired agreement between 
the District and the Association. • 
2. Will.process the applications for retirement and sick 
leave/termination pay of the eight unit employees sub-
mitted January 1980 in accordance with the provisions 
of the contract that expired on June 30, 1979:. 
3. Will negotiate.in good faith with the Association of 
Levittown School. Administrators. 
Levittown Union Free School District 
Employer 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ISLAND TREES PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
Respondent, 
-and-
NASSAU CHAPTER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
LIPP & RUBIN, P.C.,for Respondent 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH (MARJORIE KAROWE, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Nassau 
Chapter of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA) 
to a hearing officer's decision dismissing its charge that Island 
Trees Public Schools (respondent) discharged Scott Hyland in 
violation of the Taylor Law. 
Hyland, who was employed by respondent as a maintenance 
helper, was first vice-president of the local unit of CSEA. On 
February 6, 1980, he and the other non-instructional personnel 
were informed by memorandum of the respondent that they were 
expected to work on February 12, Lincoln's Birthday. Hyland 
protested because he viewed the collectively negotiated contract 
as providing a holiday on Lincoln's Birthday. The contract 
language itself was not entirely clear on the subject. On 
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER 
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January 21, however, the CSEA unit president and respondent's 
assistant superintendent had reached agreement that custodial 
staff would work on Lincoln's Birthday - a day on which school 
was in session - and would receive compensatory time off. 
Pursuant to that understanding, the respondent issued the 
memorandum of February 6. Hyland, however, did not report for 
work on Lincoln's Birthday. All but one of the other unit 
employees reported for work and the other absence was not 
related to the issue herein. 
The following day, while Hyland was at work, the superinten-
dent asked about his absence the previous day. Hyland 
acknowledged that he had been absent and he said that there 
would also be future occasions when he would be absent. Moreover, 
he indicated that on such future occasions he would persuade 
other employees to stay out with him. Respondent's superintendent 
discharged Hyland because of his deliberate absence and his 
threat that he would absent himself in the future and take other 
employees out with him.— 
The hearing officer determined that Hyland's conduct was 
not protected by the Taylor Law and he dismissed the charge. In 
support of its exceptions, CSEA argues that the hearing officer 
did not give sufficient attention to the fact that Hyland 
believed, albeit mistakenly, that Lincoln's Birthday was a 
1 The hearing officer concluded that Hyland's absence on 
Lincoln's Birthday was the sole reason for the discharge. 
The record, however, does not support his finding that 
Hyland's threat of future absences by him and others played 
no role in the discharge. 
O i (JO 
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contractual holiday. It also argues that Hyland's threat to 
absent himself in the future and to take other employees with 
him was perceived by him to be contractually sanctioned arid, 
therefore, was concerted action protected by the Taylor Law. 
CSEA's arguments are rejected. Hyland had been directed to 
work on Lincoln's Birthday by respondent and he knew of this 
direction. His mistaken belief that the direction was in 
violation of the collective agreement between respondent and 
CSEA did not protect his absence as a proper exercise of his 
statutory rights. Even if he were correct in his belief, he 
would have been wrong in absenting himself. The "appropriate 
recourse for the employees '[improperly required to work on vacation 
days] is to perform the work assignment while seeking redress 
through available legal channels." Farmingdale UFSD, 11 PERB 
113055. 
Hyland's threat to absent himself from work in the future 
and to take other employees with him was also unprotected by the 
Taylor Law. "The concerted refusal of public employees to 
perform work assigned to them is a strike within ; the meaning of 
Section 201.9 of the Taylor Law, even if the work assignment 
itself was improper." Farmlfigdale, supra. It follows a fortiori 
that it would be a strike for employees to refuse in concert to 
perform work because they mistakenly believe that the work 
assignment is improper. It would similarly violate the law to 
instigate or encourage such action. Hylandt'is statement 
constituted a threat to instigate and encourage a strike. 
' 6784 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE DETERMINE that the Island Trees Public 
Schoolsdid not violate any protected right of Scott Hyland when it 
discharged him, and we order that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
March 17, 1981 
*£<# /? /f!&r*/4*<L^ 
Id R. Newman, Chairman 
9*u. / c ^ t c ^ _ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
£ / ^ 
David C. Randies, Member 
^©2 
t o< 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HAMPTON BAYS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
-and-
FRANCIS L.. SULLIVAN, I. JOHN MAGINSKY 
and VINCENT DOTY, 
Charging Parties . 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
THOMAS A. FARR, ESQ., for Charging Parties 
On November 23, 1979, Francis L. Sullivan, I. John Maginsky 
and Vincent Doty (charging parties) filed an improper practice 
charge (U-4372) against the Hampton Bays Teachers Association, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (Association). The charging parties are non-
members of the Association paying agency fees pursuant to §208.3(b) 
of the Act. The charge alleges that the Association did not pro-
vide information to the charging parties regarding agency fee 
refund determinations for 1978-79. Section 208.3(b) of the Taylor 
Law permits agency shop fee deductions on behalf of an employee 
organization provided that it 
"..-.has established and maintained a procedure 
providing for the refund to any employee demanding 
the return any part of an agency shop fee deduction 
which represents the employee's pro rata share of 
expenditures by the organization in aid of activities 
or causes of a political or ideological nature only 
incidentally related to terms and conditions of 
employment." 
//2D-3/17/81 
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On February 21, 1980, the charging parties filed a second 
charge against the Association. This charge (U-4554) alleges that 
the Association's agency fee refund determination for 1978-79 was 
incorrect. The scope of this charge was enlarged by an amendment 
filed on April 4, 1980, alleging.that the refund determinations 
made by and for the Association's affiliates, NYSUT and AFT, were 
also wrong. " ~~~ "T ~ , ~~; 
After a hearing was held, the hearing officer issued his 
decision on August 25, 1980, sustaining both charges. He 
determined that the Association committed an improper practice in 
that it did not supply sufficient information regarding its 
agency shop fee refund determinations. He also determined that 
the Association committed an improper practice in violation of 
CSL §209-a.2(a) by refunding an incorrect amount to the charging 
parties in that it used the wrong test in determining the amount 
of the refund of the Association's share and the Association made 
no independent judgment with respect to the amount of the refund 
from that portion of the agency shop fees transmitted to NYSUT and 
AFT. The hearing officer rejected the Association's defense to 
each charge that the charging; parties failed to exhaust the steps 
in the Association's refund procedure. He also reiected a separate 
defense to the second charge that, to the extent the charge 
questions the Association's refund calculation, it is untimely 
because it was filed more than four months after the Association's 
refund determination. 
The hearing officer proposed a remedy as to both of the 
violations found. The remedy proposed with regard to the first 
charge is to direct the Association to provide appropriate finan-
:"' 6787 
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cial information at. the time of the refund determination. As to 
the second charge, the hearing officer proposed that the Associ-
ation be directed to recalculate the refund with regard to monies 
retained by the Association and to pay any extra amount due with 
interest at the rate of six percent per annum and that with respect 
to the money transmitted to the affiliates, the Association be 
directed to refund" the full: "amount 6f"""such""money With interest at 
the rate of six percent per annum. 
The Association and.the charging parties have filed excep-
tions to the hearing officer's report and recommendations. In its 
exceptions, the Association argues: 
1. PERB lacks jurisdiction as to the nature of the 
agency shop fee refund procedure, and, most particularly, PERB is 
not authorized to determine the correctness of the amount of the 
refund. 
2. The charges herein are premature because the 
charging parties did not exhaust the Association's refund pro-
cedure. 
3. The Association used the proper statutory standard 
for calculating the amount of the refund. The hearing officer's 
interpretation of the statute is not correct, and PERB may not 
interpret a statute contrary to its plain meaning in order to 
preserve its constitutionality. 
4. The Association made appropriate inquiries with 
respect to the expenditures of its affiliates for political and 
ideological purposes and met its burden of proving the appropri-
ateness and correctness of the total amount of the refund. 
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5. The remedies proposed by the hearing officer are 
beyond the authority of PERB. 
I 
m their exceptions the charging parties, in part, support 
the hearing officer's conclusions, but they also argue: 
1. An improper practice charge may be filed immediately 
upon the payment of an inadequate refund, since internal union 
procedures cannot be binding upon noniiiembers ._ ._._ 
2. In any event, the employee organization's internal 
refund procedures are inadequate and PERB should find that the 
• 
charging parties did, nevertheless, sufficiently comply with them. 
3. The proposed remedy of the hearing officer is inade-
quate in that a' complete refund of agency fee payments should now 
be ordered by PERB. 
DISCUSSION 
We consider first the jurisdictional issues raised by the 
Association. Neither charge challenges the Association's written 
refund procedure, as such, and we do not pass upon its adequacy 
under the statute. Nevertheless, we observe that much of the 
argument regarding the timing of the filing of the charges and 
the alleged failure to exhaust the organization's internal refund 
procedure arises from the imprecise terms used in the refund pro-
cedure adopted by the Association, 
The Association's written refund procedure provides merely 
for an "appeal" to the President, and then to the Executive Board. 
As written, the language of the procedure appears to confuse the 
process of initial determination by the Association of the amount 
of the refund with recourse by the objector to an appeal from such 
determination. It refers to the request for a refund as "an appeal 
6789 I 
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re Agency Fee". The written procedure requires the President of 
the Association to notify the "Appellant" as to his "decision" 
within ten days. No refund would have been made at that point. 
The President's decision, in that short, ten-day period after the 
initial request for refund is submitted, would be the initial 
decision as to what the amount of the refund would be. 
_. _._. In this case,_.. the President ':s decision was: less than that 
The evidence indicates that the President, when presented with the 
objectors' initial request for refund, made no determination of 
the amount of the refund. Instead, as stated in his letter of 
September 13, 1979, he referred the request to the Executive Board 
for decision. Nevertheless, the objectors interpreted his letter 
as a "decision" which served as the basis for their "appealing" 
to the Executive Board. Notwithstanding an "appeal" by the 
charging parties to the Executive Board on September 19, 1979, no 
decision was ever rendered by the Executive Board. 
It appears obvious that the Association did not understand 
the nature of the procedures it had adopted and consequently 
treated the appellate procedure as the process for making the 
initial refund determination. In actuality, it cannot be said that 
there was any appeal procedure, as such, which the charging parties! 
could have utilized. They pursued whatever recourse was reason-
ably available to them, and the Association's President did not 
indicate to them any other course. 
Under these circumstances, we need not pass upon the validity 
of the Association's contention that this Board should not enter- j 
tain a charge until the organization's internal review procedures 
have been exhausted. We conclude that the Association's conten-
6790 I 
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tion that the charging parties failed to exhaust the internal 
employee organization refund procedure before filing their charges 
is simply not applicable to the facts here presented and it must 
be rejected. The Association's defense with regard to the time-
liness of the second charge must also be rejected because the time 
when the refund determination was finally made cannot be ascer-
tained/ 
Charge U-4372 
We find, as the hearing officer did, that there is merit to 
the first charge. No financial information was furnished to the 
charging parties until after a prehearing conference held by this 
Board on January 10, 1980. At that time, the Association gave 
each charging party a one-page auditor's statement of the Associ-
ation's receipts and disbursements for the year ending June 30, 
1979. No information whatever has been provided to the charging 
parties as to how much of the refund represents monies forwarded 
to the Association's state and national affiliates. 
In UUP and Barry, 13 PERB 13090, we concluded that an objec-
tor should not be required to pursue the organization's appellate 
process without prior financial information furnished by the 
employee organization regarding the basis for its initial deter-
mination of the amount of the refund. We held that a refusal or 
failure to provide financial information at the time of the refund 
would so frustrate the nonmember's efforts to obtain an appropri-
ate review under the employee organization's appellate procedures 
as to discourage an appeal and permit the employee organization 
to retain monies otherwise refundable to him, thereby coercing him 
into relinquishing his right to refrain from participating in the 
organization. O^sfH 
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In this case, we are confronted with a refund procedure 
which, in reality, contains no appellate recourse. As applied by 
the Association, the procedure consists simply of a determination 
of the amount of refund by the President and Executive Board. 
1 
actina together. We conclude, nevertheless,, that the Association 
is required to furnish financial information to objectors at the 
.time_-of,...the ._r,efund...determinatipn._so.._as ...-to..permit...them, to . evaluate, 
the basis of the refund and,, if necessary, to pursue whatever 
recourse may be appropriate to review its propriety. The objector 
has no basis for judging whether further amounts are due him unless 
the employee organization makes available adequate financial in-
formation. Such a release of information should also tend to dis-
courage frivolous appeals and encourage expeditious conclusion of 
the refund procedure. The obligation to provide such information, 
therefore, must be considered a necessary part of any refund pro-
cedure, including that involved here. 
We conclude that the Association's failure or refusal to 
provide adequate financial information as to the basis of the 
refund at the time the refund was made constitutes a failure to 
maintain a proper refund procedure under §208.3(b) of the Act and 
consequently violates the employees' rights under §§202 and 
209-a.2(a) of the Act. 
The information furnished by the Association at the time of 
the prehearing conference was inadequate, as well as late. We 
1_ Since the charges before us do not challenge the provisions of 
the Association's refund procedure, it is not necessary for us 
to determine whether those provisions comply with the require-
ments of §208.3(b) of the Act. 
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have previously endeavored in the Barry case to specify the mini-
mum information which we believe an objector has a right to re-
ceive at the time of the refund. We stated that sufficiently de-
tailed information should be provided, 
"so that the employees may understand the basis 
on which their refund has been calculated and 
thus be able to determine whether an appeal is 
warranted and likely to succeed." 
While this does not-mean that the employee organization must sup-
port its determination of the amount of the refund at that time 
in the same . detail as it will, have to when the amount of the 
refund is litigated, it does mean that the employee organization 
should identify those disbursements which it has determined to be 
refundable and those which it has determined not to be. 
In the light of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions relating to 
the rights of objectors, a public sector employee organization, if 
it wishes to enjoy the benefits of any agency shop statute, is 
required to establish an internal accounting system that will 
readily identify the refundable disbursements. We do not prescribe 
in detail the system of accounts necessary to provide adequate 
information under'this agency shop provision. We determine, how-
ever, that the Association must, at the time of making any future 
refunds of any portion of agency fee payments, furnish to all 
individuals who apply for and receive refunds, an itemized audited 
statement of its receipts and disbursements, and those of any of 
its affiliates receiving any portion of its revenues from agency 
fees. This statement should indicate the basis of the Associa-
tion's determination of the amount of the refund, including iden-
tification of those disbursements of the Association and its 
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affiliates that are refundable and those that are not. 
Charge U-4554 
This case presents a question not previously considered by 
this Board. Do we have jurisdiction to consider a charge that 
alleges only that the amount of an agency shop fee refund is 
incorrect?".''-. The hearing officer answered this question in the 
affirmative. We disagree. 
Heretofore, we have asserted jurisdiction over charges 
alleging that prescribed agency shop fee refund structural pro-
cedures have been inadequate to satisfy the requirements of 
§208.3(b) that an employee organization "establish and maintain" 
a refund procedure as a condition for receiving agency shop fees. 
I n u u p
 and Eson, 11 PERB 1[3068 (1978), we ruled that a refund pro-
cedure was inadequate, on its face, because its appellate mechan-
ism imposed an unreasonable cost upon an agency shop fee payer who 
might choose to invoke it. We also found it inadequate because 
2_ We note that this is not in any event an onerous task for many 
employee organizations. Many public sector unions are now 
required by this State's Labor Law §727 to maintain detailed 
accounting records describing their receipts and disbursements 
which must, be made available to members. Much of this infor-
mation must be furnished to members on a form prescribed by 
the Industrial Commissioner. 12 NYCRR §550-2.1 and Appendix E. 
The supporting records must be maintained by-public sector 
unions and be made available for examination by members. 
12 NYCRR §550-3.1. An employee organization enjoying the 
benefits of agency shop would appear to satisfy its obligation 
to furnish information to agency shop fee payers if, with one 
addition, it makes available to them the same information that 
an employee organization covered by Labor Law §727 is required 
to make available to members. The addition would be to specify 
the extent to which each of the disbursements (Items 116 
through 134 on Appendix E) is refundable. 
6704 
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it did not apply to funds transmitted b}?- the employee organization 
to its state and national affiliates. Subsequently, in the same 
case, we ruled that the implementation of the refund procedure 
was faulty because the appellate steps were being processed too ] 
slowly. 12 PERB 113093 (1979), confirmed UUP v. Newman, 77 AD2d 709J 
i 
(Third Dept. , 1980), 13 PERB 117010, mot. for Iv. to appeal den., | 
51. NY2d_ 707.11980), ...1.3.JPERB 17016,..... .;_.... I 
We have also asserted jurisdiction to determine if an agency 
shop fee refund procedure was properly maintained, as required by 
the statute.. This issue was raised by the charge that the I 
employee organization did not provide the agency shop fee payer 
with sufficient information to make an intelligent choice whether 
or not to invoke the appellate steps. We did so in UUP and Barry, 
supra, and in companion Case U-4372, herein before us. 
We are now asked to go beyond the structural provisions of 
the refund mechanism and examine into the accuracy of its sub-
stantive final product. To determine whether this Board has the 
authority to make such inquiry, we must look at the express 
language of the agency shop fee provision and its relation to the 
basic rights granted to the employees by the statute. Section 
208.3(b) provides that in order to be eligible for agency shop fee 
payments an employee organization must have "established and 
maintained" a refund procedure. We understand this language as 
referring to a process. The absence of such a process disquali-
fies an employee organization from receiving agency shop fee pay-
ments, and an employee organization which collects agency shop 
fee payments without such a process commits an improper practice 
subject to the jurisdiction of this Board. The requirement that 
the amount of the refund be correct is not stated in the Taylor 
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Law but it is, of course, understood. The implication of this 
omission from the explicit provisions of the Taylor Law is that 
the improper practice jurisdiction of this Board may not be in- . 
voked to resolve disputes concerning the precise amount of the 
refund and a party aggrieved must look elsewhere for relief. We 
understand this to be the intent of the Legislature. 
There is logic to the distinction made by the Legislature 
between the structure of the refund process which is subject to 
PERB's jurisdiction and the precise amount of a refund which is 
not. The latter involves a question of civil liability of the 
type that is traditionally resolved by courts in civil litgation 
while the former involves the area of organizational', conduct that 
is traditionally committed to the jurisdiction of labor relations 
agencies. The right to a refund in a particular amount is anal-
ogous to the right to a particular benefit promised by a collec-
tively negotiated agreement. The Legislature has distinguished 
between the duty to negotiate in good faith, which is a process, 
and the obligation to comply with the terms of an agreement, which 
involves substantive rights. Failure to participate in the pro-
cess is an improper practice that is subject to the jurisdiction 
of this Board, but, to prevent this Board from going further than 
inquiring into the process, in L.1977, c.429, the Legislature pro-
vided that this Board: 
"shall not exercise jurisdiction over an alleged 
violation of such an agreement that would not 
otherwise constitute an improper . . . practice." 
We accordingly conclude that a substantive determination as to 
the correctness of the amount of the refund produced by the applica-
tion of the procedure is beyond the statutory power and special 
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competence of this Board. 
REMEDY 
In UUP and Barry,' supra, we found no purpose in requiring 
the employee organization to furnish the charging party with 
detailed information stating which of its past disbursements were 
refundable- because he had already appealed from the employee 
organization's determination of the amount of the refund. 
Accordingly, we found it sufficient, in that case, to order the 
employee organization to provide such detailed information when, 
in the future, it makes agency shop fee refunds. In the instant 
case, we have determined that the Association has not provided 
any internal appellate procedure concerning the amount of the 
refund. The sole appellate procedure is, therefore, a plenary 
action in court and that appeal has not yet been initiated. Thus, 
information identifying those disbursements which it and its 
affiliates deemed not to be refundable might still serve a useful 
purpose by enabling the charging parties to make informed 
judgments whether or not to sue. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in Case U-4372, 
WE DETERMINE that Hampton Bays Teachers Association, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has violated 
§209-a.2(a) of the Taylor Law, and 
WE ORDER Hampton Bays Teachers Association, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO: 
1. Within 60 days of the date of this 
decision, to furnish all individuals who 
applied for and received agency shop fee 
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refunds for 1978-79, an itemized audited 
statement of its receipts and disburse-
ments, and those of any of its affiliates 
receiving any portion of its revenues from 
agency fees. 
2. At the. time of making any future 
refunds, to"furnish; together'with those 
refunds, such explanations and information 
in the detail described herein. 
3. To post a notice in the form attached, 
at each facility at which any unit per-
sonnel are employed, on bulletin boards to 
which it has access by contract, practice 
or otherwise. 
WE FURTHER ORDER, in Case U-4554, that the charge be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
March 17, 1981 
Harold R, Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
Ul^^ 
David C. Randies, Member 
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APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify our employees that: 
1. . We will furnish all individuals who applied 
for agency shop fee refunds for 1978-79, an 
itemized audited statement of our receipts 
and disbursements, and those of any of our . 
affiliates receiving any portion of its . 
revenues from agency fees. 
• 2. We will furnish, together with refunds, an 
itemized audited statement of• our receipts-
and disbursements, and those of any of our 
affiliates receiving any portion of its 
revenues from agency fees. 
Hampton Bays Teachers Assn., NYSUT, AFT, 
Employee Organization AFL-CIO 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HUDSON FALLS PERMANENT FIREFIGHTERS, 
LOCAL 2730, 
Respondent, 
-and-
VILLAGE OF HUDSON FALLS, 
Charging Party. 
//2E-3/17/81 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4905 
HOWARD CORNELL, for Respondent 
CAFFRY, PONTIFF, STEWART, RHODES & JUDGE (J. LAWRENCE 
PALTROWITZ, ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of both the 
Village of Hudson Falls (Village ) and the Hudson Falls Permanent 
Firefighters, Local 2730 (Local 2730) to different parts of a 
hearing officer's decision determining that some demands made by 
Local 2730 in negotiations with the Village were mandatory sub-
jects of negotiation and others were not.- The charge, which was 
brought by the Village, alleges that Local 2730 violated its duty 
to negotiate in good faith by submitting to compulsory binding 
arbitx-ation six demands which do not constitute mandatory subjects 
of negotiation. The hearing officer found merit in the charge 
with respect to four of the demands and dismissed the charge with 
respect to two. In its exceptions,- Local 2730 asserts that the 
hearing officer erred in that each of the four demands found by 
her to be nonmandatory are, in fact, mandatory subjects of nego-
tiation. In its exceptions, the Village argues that one of the 
two demands found by the hearing officer to be a mandatory subjectj 
I j 
of negotiation is, in fact a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. 
1 Neither party refers to the sixth demand in its exceptions and 
we do not address it herein. 
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The first of the demands found by the hearing officer to be 
nonmandatory is for hospitalization benefits which would be pro-
vided to retired employees, including those who have retired and 
those yet to retire. The hearing officer ruled that the demand, 
insofar as it would apply to former employees who have already 
retired, is not a mandatory subject of negotiation because those 
former employees are not in the negotiating unit represented by 
- • - - - 2 - - - - - - • • •- •  -----v - - -
Local 2730. In support of its exceptions, Local 2730 argues that 
the demand is a mandatory subject of negotiation because it in-
volves a benefit which is already available to past as well as to 
present Village employees. 
We affirm the decision of the hearing officer. We conclude 
that the total demand is for a nonmandatory subject of negotiation 
because it is presented as a unitary demand (Haverstraw, 11 PERB 
113109 [1978]), an inseparable part of which deals with the non-
mandatory area of former employees. The fact that benefits which 
do not constitute a mandatory subject of negotiation are being 
provided does not create a duty to negotiate a demand that these 
benefits continue to be provided. 
The second demand found by the hearing officer to be non-
mandatory is that there shall be "at least five (5) full-time 
paid firefighters in the Hudson Falls Fire Department". The 
hearing officer ruled that a demand for a minimum manpower 
standard is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. Local 2730 
2_ The hearing officer apparently concluded that the demand for 
hospitalization for retirees would be nonmandatory as applied 
to current employees who have not yet retired because it would 
constitute a prohibited payment to retirees. This conclusion 
is incorrect. It was based upon Lynbrook v.' PERB, 64 AD2d 902 
(Third Dept., 1978), 11 PERB 1[7012,which was reversed by the 
Court of Appeals at 48 NY2d 398 (1979), 12 PERB 1f7021. 
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excepts to this ruling and argues that this is a mandatory sub-
ject of negotiation because the present contract between the 
parties provides for a minimum complement of five full-time paid 
firefighters. The existence of such a provision in the current 
agreement does not make it a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
Board of.Educafion',' W. Y. C. , 5 PERB 1(3054 (1972). 
The third demand -found-by the hearing officer to be non-
mandatory would require the Village to appoint a qualified unit 
employee whenever it is necessary to fill a vacancy in a newly 
created position. The hearing officer ruled that this is not a 
mandatory subject of negotiation because the demand is not 
limited to the filling of vacancies in positions that are, them-
selves, within the negotiating unit. We affirm this ruling. In 
its argument in support of its exceptions. Local 2730 indicates 
that an element of the demand is that vacant positions "be filled 
as soon as feasible". With this clarification of Local 2730's 
intent, there is a second reason why the demand is not a mandatory 
subject of negotiation. It would require the Village to fill 
vacancies whether or not the Village deemed it necessary to do so. 
It would thus impose an obligation, to maintain a minimum manpower 
complement. 
The last demand found by the hearing officer to be non-
mandatory provides that, 
"An off-duty fireman, if available, will report 
to duty when the fire alarm and/or alert system is 
activated and will remain on duty until he is re-
lieved by the paid fire chief of the department." 
The hearing officer determined that this demand would interfere 
with the management prerogative of the Village to determine 
COAO 
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whether or not to call in off-duty personnel,. In support of its 
exceptions, Local 2730 argues that the Village has already-
determined that off-duty firefighters who are available shall 
answer a fire alarm. While not articulated by Local 2730, the 
implication of its argument is that this demand merely would 
impose a minimum call-in provision. Even so, it is not a man-
datory subject._ of negotiation...... By its terms, the demand would _. 
prevent the Village from deciding that it no longer wishes eft-
's 
o 
duty firefighters to answer fire alarmsT 
The Village takes exception to the determination of the 
hearing officer that Local 2730 committed no wrong by insisting 
that a recognition clause contained in the past contract be 
included in the successor contract/ That recognition clause 
includes the paid fire chief of the Village within the negoti-
ating unit. The parties agree that the fire chief has been in 
the negotiating unit. The Village, however, does not now wish 
the fire chief to be continued in the unit and it asserts that 
the status of the fire chief should be resolved in a representa-
tion proceeding. 
The issue posed by this demand is not a typical scope of 
negotiation matter. In the absence of certification by this 
Board, the employer may voluntarily grant recognition by an 
express clause of a collectively negotiated agreement describing 
3 Nothing herein precludes the negotiation of a demand for call-
in compensation so long as an obligation to call in off-duty 
firefighters is not contractually imposed upon the Village, 
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the negotiating unit covered by the contract. Where the parties 
are subsequently in disagreement as to whether the described unit 
agreed upon should be continued, they may, at appropriate times, 
bring the dispute to this Board to be resolved by certification. 
A public employer may unilaterally withdraw its recognition of 
an employee organization where it has serious doubt as to the 
scope of the unit, provided that it does so by notice to the 
employee organization during the period when a representation 
petition may be filed, thereby affording the employee organiza-
"4 
tion an opportunity for recourse to this Board', Here, the 
record does not show any action by the Village at that appropri-
ate time. Ratheri it waited until the commencement of negoti-
ations with Local 2730 in the existing unit established by 
recognition and covered by prior collectively negotiated agree-
ments, and then sought to change the unit. This it cannot do. 
As the Village did not provide timely notification to Local 2730 
that it no longer deems the existing unit to be appropriate, it 
may not now impede the negotiating process by insistence upon that 
position'. • Thus "it is required to negotiate with Local 2730 in 
good faith as to the terms and conditions of employment of all 
the employees in that unit and it may not object to the inclu-
sion of a definition of that unit in the contract. 
4 See Southern Cayuga Central School' District, 9 PERB 13056 
(1976), aff'd STcaheat'ele's' Teachers' Assoc." v./ PERB, 88 Misc.2d 
816 (Onondaga County, 1976) , 9 PER.B 1(7024, and •Southern Cayuga 
Teachers' Association' v.' PERB, not officially reported 
(Montgomery County, 1977) ,10 PERB 117008, aff'd (4th Dept., 
1977), 59 AD2d 1032. • 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that all the exceptions herein 
of both the Hudson Falls Permanent 
Firefighters, Local 2730 and the Village 
of Hudson Falls be, and they hereby are, 
dismissed. 
'DATED: Albany,. New ...York 
Mar ch.17, 1.9 81,.: 
iz^UP' kr.'met. l&tC?--Ht_CfrvL~<' 
old R.Newman,Chairman 
A 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies , MembjS' r 
OOvO 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
I n t h e M a t t e r o f 
TOWN OF SMITHTOWN, 
- a n d -
E m p l o y e r , 
.LOCAL 342, LONG ISIAND PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES, 
UNITED MARINE DIVISION, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMAN'S 
ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO, 
#3A-3/17/81 
C a s e N o . C - 2 1 0 3 
P e t i t i o n e r , 
and 
PERB 5 8 . 3 
C I V I L SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 1 0 0 0 , AFSCME, A F L - C I O , 
i n t e r v e n o r . 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A. r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g h a v i n g b e e n c o n d u c t e d i n t h e 
a b o v e m a t t e r - b y - t h e P u b l i c E m p l o y m e n t R e l a t i o n s B o a r d - i n - a c c o r d a n c e '.. 
w i t h t h e P u b l i c E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r E m p l o y m e n t A c t a n d t h e R u l e s o f 
P r o c e d u r e o f t h e B o a r d , a n d i t a p p e a r i n g t h a t a n e g o t i a t i n g r e p r e -
s e n t a t i v e h a s b e e n s e l e c t e d , 
P u r s u a n t t o t h e a u t h o r i t y v e s t e d i n t h e B o a r d b y t h e P u b l i c 
E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r E m p l o y m e n t A c t , 
I T I S HEREBY CERTIFIED' t h a t L o c a l 3 4 2 , L o n g I s l a n d P u b l i c 
S e r v i c e E m p l o y e e s , U n i t e d M a r i n e D i v i s i o n , I n t e r n a t i o n a l L o n g s h o r e m a n ' s 
A s s o c i a t i o n , A F L - C I O . 
h a s b e e n d e s i g n a t e d a n d s e l e c t e d b y a m a j o r i t y o f t h e e m p l o y e e s o f 
t h e a b o v e n a m e d p u b l i c e m p l o y e r , i n t h e u n i t a g r e e d u p o n b y t h e 
p a r t i e s a n d d e s c r i b e d b e l o w , a s t h e i r e x c l u s i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r , 
t h e p u r p o s e o f c o l l e c t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s a n d t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f 
g r i e v a n c e s . 
U n i t s I n c l u d e d ; C l e r k o f t h e Works, S r . C i v i l E n g i n e e r , Chief B u i l d i n g 
I n s p e c t o r , D i r e c t o r o f P l a n n i n g , T r a f f i c Eng inee r I I I , 
Deputy Town C l e r k s , A s s e s s o r , A s s t . t o Asse s so r /Depu ty 
A s s e s s o r , Deputy R e c e i v e r of T a x e s , S r . Dog Warden> Town 
E n g i n e e r , S a n i t a t i o n S u p e r v i s o r , Town P a r k s S u p e r v i s o r , 
Sup t . o f R e c r e a t i o n I I , Ord inance I n s p e c t o r (Town I n v e s t i -
g a t o r ) , S r . P l a n n e r , A s s t . D i r e c t o r of P l a n n i n g , A s s t . 
Town E n g i n e e r , Highway E n g i n e e r , S r . C i t i z e n s Program 
S u p v r . , Drug & A l c o h o l Program C o o r d i n a t o r . 
E x c l u d e d : Data P r o c e s s i n g S u p e r v i s o r , A s s i s t a n t Town A t t o r n e y s . 
F u r t h e r , I T I S ORDERED t h a t t h e a b o v e n a m e d p u b l i c e m p l o y e r 
s h a l l n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y . w i t h L o c a l 3 4 2 , L o n g I s l a n d P u b l i c 
S e r v i c e E m p l o y e e s , U n i t e d M a r i n e D i v i s i o n , I n t e r n a t i o n a l L o n g s h o r e m a n ' 
A s s o c i a t i o n , AFL-CIO 
a n d e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t w i t h • s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i z a t i o n 
w i t h r e g a r d t o t e r m s a n d c o n d i t i o n s o f e m p l o y m e n t , a n d s h a l l 
n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h e . 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f , a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f , - g r i e v a n c e s - . 
S i g n e d on- t h e 1 6 t h d a y o f 
A l b a n y , New Y o r k 
M a r c h J , 1-981 
i r o l d R . Newman , C h a i r m a n 
I d a K L a u s , Member 
6806 Dav id C. Ra ' nd l e s , Memb 
